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ABSTRACT
The article is devoted to the study of the tax reforms in modern Russia. Tax reforms 
carried out since the beginning of the 1990s are analyzed in connection with the cy-
clical repetition of the stages of the electoral process, or the so-called electoral cycle. 
The research methodology includes the calculation of indicators characterizing the 
change in the tax system and the analysis of their dynamics at various stages of the 
electoral cycle. The main quantitative and qualitative indicators are: the tax burden 
on the economy as a whole (nominal and real); the tax burden on individual ele-
ments of GDP (on wages, on gross profit, on actual final consumption); the number 
of changes made to tax legislation; terms and procedure of tax amnesty. Three stages 
of tax reforms have been identified (1993–1996, 1997–2000, 2001–present) for research 
in modern history of Russia. The first two stages of tax reforms directly coincided 
with the electoral cycles. The third modern stage of tax reforms is implemented dur-
ing several electoral cycles. The revealed influence of elections on the tax system of 
Russia results in a cyclical increase of the tax burden on the main elements of GDP in 
the first years of cycles and lowering of the tax burden in the final years of electoral 
cycles. In the elective period for elections to the State Duma, the nominal tax burden 
on the economy is always reduced. In the election year and next year of the electoral 
cycle, there is an increase in effective rates for profit, consumption and labor. In the 
final years of the electoral cycle, there is a decrease in effective rates for profit, con-
sumption and labor. Thus, the results of the study confirmed the assumption on the 
existence of a relationship between tax reforms and elections in Russia and the pos-
sibility of increasing the tax burden in the short term
KEYWORDS
Tax reform, transformation of the tax system, tax burden, tax legislation, tax amnesty, 
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HIGHLIGHTS
1. The relationship between tax reforms and electoral cycles in Russia is unambigu-
ously present. The intensity of the relationship is determined by the degree of com-
petition in the elections
2. The electoral cycles for the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation 
have a stronger impact on tax reforms in Russia
3. Legislative activity on reforming the tax system of the Russian Federation is associ-
ated with the stages of the electoral cycle (declining in the election year in the State 
Duma and increasing in the pre-election period)
4. Tax amnesties are unambiguously connected with the electoral process and their 
conduct is confined to the elective period
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Статья посвящена исследованию налоговых реформ в современной России. 
Проведенные с начала 1990-х гг. налоговые преобразования анализируются 
во взаимосвязи с циклическим повторением этапов выборного процесса, или 
так называемым электоральным циклом. Методика исследования включает 
в себя расчет показателей, характеризующих изменение налоговой системы 
и анализ их динамики на разных этапах электорального цикла. В качестве 
основных количественных и качественных показателей выбраны: налоговое 
бремя на экономику в целом (номинальное и реальное); налоговое бремя на 
отдельные элементы ВВП (на оплату труда, на валовую прибыль, на факти-
ческое конечное потребление); количество изменении, внесенных в налого-
вое законодательство; сроки и порядок проведения налоговых амнистий. Для 
исследования в современной истории России выделены три этапа налоговых 
реформ (1993–1996 гг.; 1997–2000 гг.; 2001 г. — настоящее время). Первые два 
этапа налоговых реформ прямо совпадали с электоральными циклами. Тре-
тий современный этап налоговых реформ реализуется в течение нескольких 
электоральных циклов. Выявленное влияние выборов на налоговую систему 
России заключается в циклическом повышении налоговой нагрузки на основ-
ные элементы ВВП в первые годы циклов и понижении налоговой нагрузки в 
завершающие годы электоральных циклов. В выборный период по выборам 
в ГД РФ всегда снижается номинальное налоговое бремя на экономику. В год 
выборов и следующий год электорального цикла наблюдается повышение 
эффективных ставок на прибыль, потребление и труд. В завершающие годы 
электорального цикла отмечается понижение эффективных ставок на при-
быль, потребление и труд. Таким образом, результаты исследования подтвер-
дили предположение о существовании взаимосвязи между налоговыми пре-
образованиями и выборами в России и возможность повышения налоговой 
нагрузки в ближайшей перспективе
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
Налоговая реформа, трансформация налоговой системы, налоговое бремя, на-
логовое законодательство, налоговая амнистия, электоральный цикл, выборы 
Президента, выборы в Государственную Думу
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ 
1. Взаимосвязь между налоговыми преобразованиями и электоральными ци-
клами в России однозначно присутствует. Интенсивность взаимосвязи опреде-
ляется степенью конкуренции на выборах
2. Более сильное влияние на налоговые реформы в России оказывают электо-
ральные циклы по выборам в Государственную Думу РФ
3. Законодательная активность по реформированию налоговой системы РФ 
связана с этапами электорального цикла (снижается в год выборов в ГД и воз-
растает в предвыборном периоде)
4. Налоговые амнистии однозначно связаны с электоральным процессом и их 
проведение приурочено к выборному периоду
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1. Introduction
President’s elections have just fin-
ished in Russia as well as a regular elector-
al cycle has ended. Political scientists are 
now making forecasts on possible changes 
in the government and further steps of the 
President, but we are interested whether 
there will be any changes in the tax leg-
islation after the election. The Ministry of 
Finance of the Russian Federation prom-
ises predictable fiscal conditions and no 
increase of the tax burden on bona fide 
taxpayers in the Main Directions of the 
budgetary, tax and customs tariff policy 
for 2018 and for the planning period 2019 
and 20201.
It is well known that taxes might be 
a bright element of an election campaign. 
Remember the famous promises of the 
western leaders “Read my leaps — no 
new taxes”. But in reality, the election 
promises, and factual actions do not al-
ways match, and the tax reforms are not 
an exclusion in this case. 
Dictionaries provide two definitions 
of the word “reform”. The first defini-
tion of “reform” is “to improve, to make 
close to perfection”. Other definition is 
“to change, to transform”. When politi-
cians discuss the necessity of tax reforms 
they usually have in mind both mean-
ings: the reform is the change in the tax 
system which leads to its improvement. 
Nevertheless, in most cases, changes can 
be considered an improvement only from 
the point of view of their initiators. His-
tory knows examples when the improve-
ments of the tax system made by one gov-
ernment for tax reform were abolished by 
the next government also for tax reform 
purposes.
Is there a link between the tax reforms 
in the Russian Federation and the elec-
tions? We proceed from the hypothesis 
that the change of electoral cycles must 
be accompanied by appropriate changes 
in the tax sphere. And the tax reforms 
1 Information of the official website of 
the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Fe-
deration. Available at: http://minfin.ru/
ru/document/?id_4=119695&amp;area_
id=4&amp;page_id=2104&amp;popup=Y#ixzz
5D0hprOOJ.
themselves are derived from the political 
pre-election promises. In this regard, elec-
toral cycles should lead to qualitative and 
quantitative changes in the country’s tax 
system.
To prove the hypothesis, we analyze 
the main aspects of tax system transfor-
mation in modern Russia and refer the 
changes to the stages of electoral cycle.
In our research we are trying to an-
swer several questions:
1. Which changes in the tax system of 
the RF were prevailing before and after 
the elections?
2. Which type of elections is connected 
with tax reforms more closely — parlia-
ment or president’s elections?
3. Is it possible to claim that there is 
the relationship between tax reforms and 
electoral cycles in Russia?
For the purpose of tax reform study 
qualitative changes of tax burden as the 
integral indicator of taxation are analyzed 
including the changes in the effective tax 
burden for tax groups, as well as qualita-
tive changes in taxation, tax administra-
tion and control. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the 
next two parts we consider theoretical 
substantiation of the relationship between 
tax reforms and elections and the research 
methodology. In the fourth part we de-
scribe general characteristics and trends of 
tax transformation in modern Russia. The 
analysis of the tax burden in the tax sys-
tem of Russia in the period of 1993–2018 
is made in the fifth part, and the relation 
of the said tax burden with the electoral 
cycle. In the sixth part we have analyzed 
the frequency of the tax legislation chang-
es and certain aspects of tax administra-
tion linked to the timing of electoral cycle. 
Final part of the paper devoted to discus-
sions on the result of analysis.
We analyzed the tax changes from 
1993 to 2016. The choice of the time period 
is connected both with the availability of 
statistical data (statistics for calculating 
the tax burden for 2017 are not yet fully 
available) and with the periodization of 
the electoral cycle in Russia.
Several variants of electoral cycle 
periodization are suggested at present. 
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First, the elections of 1989, when the 
elections to the Supreme Counsel of the 
USSR were held with some elements of 
the alternative. Second, some authors 
suggest considering the dates of the elec-
toral processes since 1990 and even 1991, 
when the first elections of the President 
of the Russian Soviet Federative Social-
ist Republic took place. The majority of 
the researchers support the opinion that 
electoral development should be consid-
ered only since 1993, when the Constitu-
tion was adopted and the first elections to 
the State Duma of the Russian Federation 
took place [1]. In this case the first elec-
toral cycle started in autumn 1993 with 
the dissolution of the Supreme Council 
of the RSFSR and the beginning of the 
electoral campaign for the State Duma of 
RF of the first convocation. In the period 
of time since adopting the Constitution 
of 1993 six cycles of the federal elections 
took place in Russia — the elections to 
the state Duma, and in 3–6 months — the 
elections of the President. 
2. Literature Review
The classics of Marxism-Leninism 
drew attention to the interrelationship 
of politics and economics. They distin-
guished the following relations: the pri-
macy of the economy in relation to poli-
tics, the active backward impact of politics 
on the economy, the primacy of politics 
over the economy.
They derived defining the nature of 
the economy impact on politics from the 
fundamental position of Marxism on the 
primacy of the economic basis and the 
secondary nature of the superstructure. 
The nature of the reverse effect was con-
sidered depending on the state of the lat-
ter, since “all governments, even the most 
absolutist, are ultimately only executors 
of economic necessity...” [2, p. 314]. The 
founders of Marxism-Leninism singled 
out three main directions of the impact 
of politics on the economy: politics can 
either accelerate economic development, 
acting in accordance with its laws, or slow 
it down by putting obstacles to the move-
ment of the economy; or act simultane-
ously in the first two directions, then the 
total influence will be either accelerating 
or retarding. 
In Western political science electoral 
cycles are actively studied for various 
purposes and with various scientific ap-
proaches. Widely spread are the studies 
of changes in the electoral behavior of vot-
ers and authority agents during a certain 
cycle. A. Campbell argued that the presi-
dential electoral cycles in the US differ in 
the degree of support for the presidential 
party during the elections and after the 
elections. From the degree of this sup-
port, which is cyclical, depends both on 
the overall course of the elections, and on 
their outcomes [3].
Early theories of fiscal choices (for in-
stance, J. Buchanan and R. Wagner) based 
on political considerations highlight the 
manipulation of government expenditures 
by policymakers trying to get re-elected. 
The basic argument is that voters value 
public spending but consistently underes-
timate its costs in terms of the tax burden, 
especially if those costs are postponed. 
Thus, voters support policymakers who 
provide high levels of deficit-financed ex-
penditures, and oust incumbents who are 
fiscally conservative [4]. 
Public choice theory explains and in-
terprets politics as the interaction among 
constituents and agents seeking to advance 
or to express their own interests. J. M. Bu-
chanan explains the tax changes as the po-
litical event and shows that it depends crit-
ically on the model of political choice [5]. 
Political reality of tax changes presumably 
embodies some mix of models of consen-
sus, conflict, and agents’ discretion.
In particular, according to the theo-
ry of party preferences A. Gelman and 
G. King, voter preferences are formed 
during election campaigns, if the media 
provide voters with the necessary infor-
mation on the basis of which voters de-
termine their social position and evaluate 
party platforms [6]. Models of support for 
parties by voters throughout the entire 
electoral cycle may change. In the middle 
of the electoral cycle, the party that won 
the parliamentary elections loses its popu-
larity. Before the next election, it restores 
voters’ confidence.
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A. Drazin continued his research in 
this direction. He analyzed the explana-
tory possibilities of the first model of the 
monetary policy-business cycle and re-
viewed the theories that emerged over 
the next 25 years [7]. W. L. Miller and 
M. Mackie characterize electoral cycles 
through the dependence of political party 
popularity on economic conditions [8].
The neoinstitutional approach pro-
vides more opportunities to characterize 
political changes during certain electoral 
cycles. The influence of institutional de-
sign on elections and vice versa is stud-
ied by American political scientists M. 
Shugart and M. Soberg [9]. They believe 
that the parliamentary elections set the 
logic for the development of the entire 
electoral cycle. The low weight of the 
presidential party in parliament jeopar-
dizes the formation of the government 
and makes its work ineffective. A frag-
mented government in the presidential 
system often leads to pathological situ-
ations. Thus, the institutional specifics 
of government formation sets the logic 
for the development of the election cam-
paign and determines the content of the 
electoral cycle.
Substantially more productive, but at 
the same time less developed is the polit-
ical-economic approach. From the stand-
point of this approach, a number of inter-
esting models of the electoral cycle have 
been developed. For the first time, a ratio-
nal model of the electoral cycle was devel-
oped by W. Nordhaus [10]. The model is 
based on the fact that politicians manipu-
late economic policy before elections to in-
crease the chances of re-election. 
G. Brennan and J. M. Buchanan in 
1980 offer an approach to the understand-
ing and evaluation of the fiscal system, in 
which government is modelled as “reve-
nue-maximizing Leviathan” [11]. The cen-
tral question becomes: how much “power 
to tax” would the citizen voluntarily grant 
to government as a party to some initial 
social contract devising a fiscal constitu-
tion? Armed with such a model, politics 
in the office after elections assumed to 
exploit the power assigned to them to the 
maximum possible extent. 
The model of the K. Rogoff budget 
cycle equilibrium is very interesting [12]. 
Under this model, the government signals 
its desire to be re-elected during the elec-
toral cycle through the implementation of 
fiscal policy. As a rule, budgetary expen-
ditures increase before the elections.
The most interesting for our study is 
the model developed by Per Pettersson-
Lidbom. He revealed the dependence 
between the electoral success of the cur-
rent government, the level of government 
spending and the collection of taxes. On 
the example of local executive elections in 
Sweden, he analyzes the explanatory pos-
sibilities of the theory of rational cycles. 
Pettersson-Leadbom made the following 
interesting conclusions: (1) the govern-
ment increases expenditures and reduces 
taxes in the election year; (2) the govern-
ment, which has a better chance of being 
reelected, implements large expenditures 
in the election year; (3) a year after the 
election, re-elected governments spend 
more than the governments just elected 
and, accordingly, reduce tax rates; (4) re-
elected governments spend less after the 
elections than in the election year and 
taxes are collected more; (5) tax conditions 
and the level of government spending af-
fect electoral success [13].
Some studies indicate the close con-
nection between the elections and timing 
of tax reform.
For example, J. L. Mikesell shows that 
much of the pattern of state tax policy 
changes can be traced directly by elections 
[14]. They argue that state parties are con-
cerned with gaining and retaining politi-
cal power and that the severity of public 
reaction declines with the passage of time. 
The outcome is a distinct rate change cycle 
with the broad based taxes. Politically, 
state governments find it rational to in-
crease statutory rates of major taxes at two 
points in the election cycle (three years 
and one year before the elections).
A. Alesina, D. Carloni and G. Lecce ex-
amined the conventional wisdom that fis-
cally “tight” governments lose popularity 
and elections and strong and popular gov-
ernment can implement fiscal adjustments 
and be reelected [15]. They found surpri-
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singly little evidence supporting this con-
ventional wisdom and no evidence that 
even large reductions of budget deficits 
are always associated (or most of the time) 
with electoral losses. The authors note 
that it is difficult to measure “strength” of 
a government, ex ante, and therefore their 
test should be taken cautiously. 
H. Ehrhart analyses the impact of the 
electoral calendar on the composition of 
tax revenue (direct versus indirect taxes) 
[16]. It thus represents an extension of tra-
ditional political budget-cycle analyses as-
sessing the impact of elections on overall 
revenue. Using the panel data from 56 de-
veloping countries over the 1980–2006 pe-
riod authors find robust evidence of lower 
indirect taxes being applied by incumbent 
governments in the period just prior to an 
election. Indirect tax revenue in election 
years is estimated to be 0.3 GDP percent-
age points lower than in other years, cor-
responding to a fall of about 3.4 % of the 
average figure in the sample countries, 
while there is no such relationship with 
direct tax revenue.
M. Hallerberg and C. Scartascini finds 
support for the role of elections and bank-
ing crises in the timing of tax reforms and 
the allocation of the additional tax bur-
den [17]. They argue that during electoral 
periods, increasing taxes becomes highly 
unlikely, even if the government is facing 
financing problems. Interestingly, politics 
seem to trump economics: banking crises 
do not affect the probability of having a 
reform during electoral times. 
It is interesting that modern studies 
have confirmed the positions of the clas-
sics of Marxism-Leninism about the pri-
macy of the economy in relation to politics 
for countries with a long history of demo-
cratic elections. Our study is designed to 
find out whether this provision is relevant 
for Russia. 
3. Research Methodology
3.1. The tax burden indicators
To study the relationship between the 
electoral cycle and taxes, we are primarily 
going to analyze the change in the tax bur-
den. Tax burden indicator characterizes 
the proportion of mandatory payments 
paid to the country’s budget system in the 
corresponding resulting source of their 
payment (gross product, value added, in-
come, etc.). The economic meaning of this 
indicator can be considered as a form of the 
monopoly price of aggregate public goods, 
in which the measure of the public servic-
es value is expressed. Payers of obligatory 
payments here act as forced “buyers” of 
public services, the cost of which is set by 
the state, in the form of the rates of these 
payments for the next year. While the sell-
er (the state) is trying to inflate the price 
of its services, buyers (taxpayers) tend to 
lower it, hiding objects and income from 
taxation. There are, so-called “scissors” be-
tween nominal (assessed) and real (actual) 
indicators of the tax burden. The real tax 
burden is an indicator characterizing the 
ratio of the actually paid mandatory pay-
ments amount to the value of the corre-
sponding activity result. The nominal tax 
burden is an indicator characterizing the 
ratio of the amount of assessed mandatory 
payments to the value of the correspond-
ing result of activity. These “scissors” are 
always present and in all indicators of the 
burden. Their scale directly indicates the 
level of tax discipline, the effectiveness of 
the tax administration system, the state of 
the economy. But the main thing is that 
the scale of these “scissors” is an indica-
tor of the acceptability or unacceptability 
of the existing level of the tax burden, and 
in fact, the price of aggregate public goods 
established by the state. The existing level 
of the tax burden shows the degree of cen-
tralization and socialization of GDP and 
its components, which, on the one hand, 
carries a stamp of subjective, monopoly 
actions by the government, and on the oth-
er hand reflects objective market and tax 
patterns, features of the tax policy model, 
economic model and the achieved level of 
socio-economic development of the coun-
try. The methodology for calculating the 
tax burden applied by the state statistics 
bodies determines the tax burden (TBn) as 
the percentage of actual tax revenues in the 
budget system (TR) in GDP (GDP): 
100%.
TRTBn
GDP
= ⋅
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The use of actual receipts as a numera-
tor indicates the calculation of the real indi-
cator. This indicator is suitable to make in-
ternational comparative analysis of the tax 
burden. It does not show full and objective 
understanding of the burden’s actual grav-
ity. The numerator of the tax burden indi-
cator should reflect the amount of accrued, 
not paid (actually received in the budget) 
payments, i.e. for domestic use, it is neces-
sary to operate with nominal values.
The difference between nominal and 
real indicators is formed by so-called “tax 
scissors”.
For analytical purposes and the devel-
opment of tax policy measures, it is also 
possible to calculate the following tax bur-
den indicators for individual elements of 
GDP in the System of National Accounts: 
on labor (taking into account insurance 
premiums), on gross profit in the economy, 
and on actual final consumption. At the 
same time, only those accrued taxes, fees 
and mandatory payments will be reflected 
in the numerator, the source of their pay-
ment is the corresponding basic indicator. 
These indicators reflect the effective 
aggregate tax rate applied to a particular 
element of GDP. To calculate three price 
indicators (effective tax rates for labor, 
consumption and profit) we will use the 
following formulas.
The index of the nominal tax burden 
on labor (TBlabour):
100%,
factual factual
debt debt
labour
official
PIT SP
PIT SPTB
LP
+ +
+ +
= ⋅
where PITfactual — Personal Income Tax 
factual, SPfactual — actual receipts of the 
tax on incomes of individuals and set of 
social payments; PITdebt — debts on these 
taxes (payments); LPofficial (Labor Payment 
official) — official remuneration of wage 
workers (without hidden wages).
Nominal burden on consumption 
(TBnconsumption):
100%,
factual factual
factual factual
debt debt
debt debt
consumption
house
EX VAT
MET AR
EX VAT
MET ARTBn
FHC
+ +
+ + +
+ + +
+ +
= ⋅
where EXfactual (excise tax), VATfactual, 
METfactual (Mineral extraction tax), 
ARfactual — actual receipts of excises, VAT, 
MET and other payments for natural re-
sources sold on the territory of the country, 
import duties; EXdebt, VATdebt, METdebt — 
debts on these taxes and duties; FHChouse — 
actual final consumption of households.
The index of nominal burden on gross 
profit (TBnprofit):
100%,
factual factual
debt debt
profit
CIT ACIT
CIT ACITTBn
GP
+ +
+ +
= ⋅
where CITfactual (income tax), ACITfactual 
(aggregate income tax) — actual income 
tax on profits and taxes on total income; 
CITdebt, ACITdebt — debts on these taxes; 
GP — gross profit of the economy and 
gross mixed incomes.
Official Rosstat data were used for 
the calculations. For the structuring of 
electoral cycles in Russia, a chronologi-
cal principle was used. This principle al-
lows better understanding of the interre-
lationship of political and socio-economic 
events in a certain period of time, and 
therefore, makes factoral assessment of 
political changes and tax reforms easier. 
Thus, the breakdown of the electoral pro-
cess into cycles in our case may contribute 
to a better understanding of political de-
velopment and tax reform periodization 
in Russia.
3.2. Electoral cycle in Russia
The concept of the electoral cycle is 
used to visualize and better understand 
the cyclical nature of the changes taking 
place in the electoral process. This tool was 
developed by the European Commission, 
the International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance and the United 
Nations Development Program2. The elec-
toral cycle regards elections as an ongoing 
process, which is divided into three main 
periods: the pre-election period, the elec-
toral period and the post-election period. 
It is noteworthy that the electoral cycle 
does not have fixed initial or end points, 
2 Available at: http://aceproject.org/
electoral-advice/electoral-assistance/electoral-
cycle#_ftn1.
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which is also true for all periods in the 
cycle. Theoretically, we can say that one 
cycle ends when another begins and the 
same applies to the periods in the cycle.
Six electoral companies for the elec-
tion of the President and the State Duma 
were held during the analyzed period in 
the modern history of Russia (Table 1).
Table 1
Federal Elections in Russia 1993–2018
Period  
of 
election
Date
Elections to the 
State Duma 
Elections of 
the President 
1995–1996 December 17, 1995 June 16, 1996
July 3, 1996
1999–2000 December 19, 1999 March 26, 2000
2003–2004 December 7, 2003 March 14, 2004
2007–2008 December 2, 2007 March 2, 2008
2011–2012 December 4, 2011 March 4, 2012
2016–2018 September 18, 2016 March 18, 2018
Taking into account the periodization 
of the stages of the electoral cycle, for the 
purposes of our research, we will allocate 
six election periods, taking as reference 
the elections to the State Duma (the first 
period — 1995, the second period — 1999, 
the third period — 2003, the fourth pe-
riod — 2007, the fifth period — 2011, the 
sixth period — 2016).
The comparison of the electoral cycle 
and elections to the State Duma has his-
torical roots and is connected with ensur-
ing the legality of taxation. In the history 
of Western democracy formation, much of 
the political changes were based on resist-
ing arbitrary taxation. Thus, the history of 
parliamentary power in the UK is closely 
linked to the struggle to restrict the king’s 
right to raise taxes, and the American 
revolution began with protests against the 
use of the metropolitan tax without agree-
ment with the colony.
Representing the interests of taxpay-
ers in parliament is considered a demo-
cratic guarantee against arbitrary taxation 
on the part of the state. In the Russian 
Federation, tax authority for the establish-
ment and imposition of taxes belongs to 
representative authorities. The only ex-
ception is the decrees of the President of 
the Russian Federation, which can make 
changes in the tax legislation, but should 
not contradict it and the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation. Therefore, shall 
we consider first of all the relationship be-
tween tax transformations and parliamen-
tary elections.
4. General Characteristics and Trends  
of Tax Transformation in Modern Russia
Like any socio-economic system, the 
tax system is constantly being transformed. 
According to the point of view ascending 
to A. Smith, the tax system should be char-
acterized by stability and immutability for 
sufficiently long periods of time.
However, the twentieth century. 
made adjustments to the concepts of dyna-
mism and stability. The rate of change in 
modern economic systems has increased 
significantly, so the change in tax systems 
should be adequate.
The formation and further reform of 
the tax system urgently adopted in Russia 
was implemented even more dynamically. 
Although this process should be charac-
terized rather not as purposeful-dynamic, 
but as chaotic-dynamic, especially at first. 
This practice has developed due to a num-
ber of objective reasons for the 1990s:
– the rapidity of the transition from a 
planned to a market economy;
– lack of the required scientific and 
methodological elaboration of the reform, 
long-term program of its implementation 
and clear targets;
– large-scale borrowing of foreign tax 
structures and their subsequent adapta-
tion to Russian conditions, using as the 
main trial and error method;
– excessive subordination to the 
changing political conjuncture.
4.1. The first stage of tax reforms:  
1993–1996 (the first electoral cycle)
The essence of this stage was to run 
new models of taxes, to adapt them and to 
find ways to reform. By 1992, in the most 
urgent order, a tax system was created, 
where all possible list of taxes, fees and 
other obligatory payments was recorded 
at the same time.
The formed three-level system of a 
limited number of federal, but unlimited 
number of regional and local taxes and 
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fees (one listing of which does not fit on 
the whole page), could not initially be per-
fect. The lack of domestic experience and 
relevant scientific developments, low tax-
ation culture and responsibility of payers, 
weakness of state power and local self-
government predetermined low efficiency 
of the system functioning at the first stage. 
It did not implement fiscal, not to mention 
other functions of taxation in full. At the 
same time, one should note that although 
the scale of failures in the sphere of taxa-
tion in the first half of the 1990s was signif-
icant enough, but in general it should not 
be over-exaggerated. Tax failures are in-
commensurably fewer than the more seri-
ous failures of that time committed in the 
economy, public administration, finance, 
national relations and other spheres.
As I. V. Gorsky notes, at the beginning 
of the reform, the overall assessment of 
the formed tax system was quite satisfac-
tory for the following reasons [18].
From a financial point of view, this 
system was quite diverse, covering all 
objects of taxation (income, property, con-
sumption), and was able to meet budget-
ary needs under controlled inflation.
From the economic point of view, 
the planned tax burden should not, on 
the whole, discourage the development 
of production. However, the balance be-
tween the taxation of income and con-
sumption was violated towards the latter. 
So, a number of taxes on incomes did not 
have high rates by international stan-
dards, in particular such taxes as on profit 
and income. Taxes on property were also 
insignificant. Fearing for decades of un-
satisfied desire to consume, the reformers 
introduced two extraordinary elements in 
taxation to limit consumer appetites and 
inflationary consequences. First, VAT was 
introduced at an extremely high rate of 
28 %, which has no analogues in world 
practice. Secondly, against the backdrop 
of fairly high social fund contributions 
(up to 39 %), for several years the level 
of remuneration of labor was regulated 
through profit taxation (a four-, six- and 
even eightfold excess of wages over the 
established minimum was included in the 
income tax base).
From a social point of view, the re-
form was the least developed. Pensions 
and social security systems were sorely 
lacking in funds. The high standards of 
social payments did not save, and under 
the conditions of hyperinflation instantly 
depreciated. Besides, the negative effect 
of high VAT limited the already low level 
of consumption of the least well-off strata 
contributed to the worsening of social sta-
bility in society, as well as the unknown 
previously differentiation in the distribu-
tion of incomes, which is impossible to 
take away by the progressive taxation of 
personal incomes in the absence of real 
control.
4.2. The second stage of tax reform:  
1997–2000 (the second electoral cycle)
The essence of this stage was the tran-
sition to an active and purposeful reform 
of the tax system. This step was taken from 
the announcement of the President’s Ad-
dress to the Federal Assembly on March 6, 
1997, which determined its main direc-
tions (see Figure 1) [19, рр. 360].
This message encouraged the process 
of choosing the direction of tax reforms. It 
was from this moment on that the reform 
of taxes acquired the features of purpose-
ful and justified actions. In 1998, the Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation finally 
settled on the project of the evolutionary 
improvement of the tax system proposed 
by the Ministry of Finance. It was the basis 
for the development of the Tax Code (TC), 
the first part of which was put into effect 
on January 1, 1999.
One of the main reform directions 
was a significant restriction of the previ-
ously granted and almost unlimited pow-
ers of regional and local government lev-
els in the field of establishing new taxes 
and fees, and the distribution of tax rev-
enues between budgets of various levels. 
The regional and local initiatives in this 
area by the mid-1990s essentially turned 
into tax arbitrariness, which caused the 
inequality of economic conditions in 
various regions and became a real threat 
to lose the unity of the country’s eco-
nomic space. Cardinal changes here were 
achieved with the adoption of part one of 
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the first TC, which determined the scope 
of their powers to establish, modify and 
abolish regional and local taxes. The most 
significant result of this direction was a 
closed (exhaustive) list of regional and 
local taxes, beyond which a tax initiative 
of the appropriate level could no longer 
go out. Thus, the subjects of the Russian 
Federation and local self-government 
bodies have lost the opportunity to in-
troduce taxes or fees in excess of the list 
established by the TC.
Another no less important area of re-
form was the reduction in the total num-
ber of taxes and fees. Before 1996, the list 
of tax payments in Russia was at least 46 
types, differing significantly in different 
regions of the country. With the adop-
tion of the first part of the Tax Code, the 
amount of taxes and duties at all levels de-
creased by almost 20 %, amounting to 35 
taxes and fees.
Another important area of reform 
was the reduction of tax rates for the main 
budget-forming taxes. Examples are suffi-
cient. So, for VAT, the total rate changed 
from 28 % in 1992 up to 20 % in 1999. The 
corporate income tax rate decreased al-
most twofold: from 45 % in 1992 to 35 % in 
1996 and further, from 1999 to 24 %.
The taxation of incomes of citizens 
was also significantly changed. Progres-
sive taxation of income tax, when the max-
imum rate of this tax was 40 % since 1992, 
and then 30 % since 1996, was replaced in 
1999 by a “flat” personal income tax (per-
sonal income tax) scale with a basic rate of 
only 13 %.
It should be noted that the adoption 
of the Tax Code was intended to ensure 
the formation of an understandable and 
simple tax system. Against the back-
ground of positive effects, the reform was 
not without a number of less significant, 
but still observed shortcomings. The gen-
eral provisions in many ways proved to 
be “dangling in the air”(left without any 
result) without solving the fundamental 
problems of construction and the applica-
tion of specific taxes and fees.
In this connection, the work on the 
second part of the TC was speeded up, the 
adoption of the first four chapters of which 
marked the beginning of a new stage.
4.3. The third stage of tax reform:  
2001 — present (the third, fourth, fifth  
and sixth ejector cycles)
The third stage of tax reforms was 
implemented during four electoral cycles. 
The essence of this stage is the codification 
of an exhaustive list of taxes and fees in 
modern Russia. The sequence of codifica-
tion is presented in Table 2.
The cardinal simplification of the tax system, the reduction of the total 
number of taxes and the establishment of an exhaustive list of taxes, 
the use of which is permitted in the territory of the Russian Federation
Alignment of taxation conditions by sharply reducing 
the number of tax benefits
Expansion of the tax base by extending the real tax burden to the areas 
in which tax evasion is most practiced
Alignment of the actual level of taxation of wages and other types
of income (including deductions to extra-budgetary funds)
Establishing limit rates for regional and local taxes
Reduction of fine and penalty rates
Codification of rules regulating relations between taxpayers 
and tax authorities in order to eliminate contradictions in civil 
and tax legislation, ensure the protection of taxpayers’ rights 
Th
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Figure 1. The Main directions of the second stage of the reform 
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Thus, 17 taxes (fees) and 5 special tax 
regimes were codified in four electoral cy-
cles. The greatest legislative activity falls 
on the third cycle, during which 11 taxes 
(fees) and 3 special tax regimes were codi-
fied. During the fifth cycle there was no 
legislative activity.
In general, the formation of the second 
part, despite the annual changes intro-
duced, can be considered almost complete. 
The Tax Code became a single, systematic 
document regulating the whole set of tax 
relations in the Russian Federation.
It is extremely important that the 
codification of taxes was accompanied by 
their parallel revision. It was necessary 
to eliminate inefficient and overlapping 
taxes, as well as so-called negotiable, in-
herently “non-market” taxes, which was 
done at the beginning of the third stage. A 
significant success of such a revision can 
be considered the abolition of taxes on the 
maintenance of housing and social and 
cultural facilities. A striking example of a 
non-market tax was also the tax on road 
users, levied on sales revenues. The tax 
amount paid was included in the price of 
the products at each stage of production 
according to the turnover tax principle. 
The amount of tax was accumulated with 
each new stage of the technological chain 
of production and the advantages were 
obtained by the manufacturer of techno-
logically simple products, which did not 
contribute to the normal development 
of the economy. The total cancellation of 
this tax occurred in 2003, while the bud-
get losses were compensated to a certain 
extent by an increase in excise taxes on 
fuels and lubricants and a change in the 
procedure for the application of excises in 
respect of petroleum products, as well as 
the introduction of a transport tax.
Examples of taxes with the same ob-
ject of taxation and a similar tax base 
were deductions for the reproduction of 
mineral resources and payments for the 
use of subsoil. Since 2002, these two pay-
ments, as well as excises for oil and stable 
gas condensate, have been organically re-
Table 2
Sequence of the introduction of the Russian Federation Tax Code, Chapters of Part II 
Implementation Electoral cycle The Tax Code Chapters
Since January 1, 2001 The third elec-
toral cycle
Chapter 21. Value added tax
Chapter 22. Excises
Chapter 23. Personal Income Tax
Chapter 24. Unified social tax (cancelled since January 1, 
2010)
Since January 1, 2002 Chapter 25. Corporate income tax
Chapter 26. Tax on mining operations
Chapter 261. The system of taxation for agricultural pro-
ducers (single agricultural tax)
Chapter 27. Sales tax (canceled from 1 January 2004)
Since January 1, 
2003.
Chapter 26.2. Simplified system of taxation
Chapter 26.3. The system of taxation in the form of a sin-
gle tax on imputed income for certain types of activities
Chapter 28. Transport tax
Since January 1, 2004 Chapter 25.1. Charges for the use of objects of fauna and 
aquatic biological resources
Chapter 26.4. The Taxation System in the Implementation 
of Production Sharing Agreements
Chapter 29. Tax on gambling business
Chapter 30. Corporate Property Tax
Since January 1, 2005 The fourth 
electoral cycle
Chapter 25.2. The water tax
Chapter 25.3. The State Duty
Chapter 31. Land tax
Since January 1, 2013 The sixth elec-
toral cycle
Chapter 26.5. Patent system of taxation
Since January 1, 2015 Chapter 32. Personal Property Tax
Chapter 33. Trading fee
Since January 1, 2017 Chapter 34. Insurance premiums
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placed by a mineral extraction tax that has 
comprehensively covered various taxable 
resource objects.
Until 2004, indirect taxes such as VAT 
and sales tax were similar on a tax base. 
Most countries have long abandoned their 
parallel application, the practice of their 
simultaneous existence persisted only in 
Russia and Canada, so the sales tax was 
abolished in 2004. In the past two years, 
the number of taxes and charges has sta-
bilized, increasingly acquiring features of 
a certain logical completeness, despite the 
fact that some progress in reducing their 
composition is still continuing: from 2006, 
the tax on inheritance and donation has 
been abolished. Thus, the number of taxes 
and fees in the Russian Federation has 
steadily declined over the past 10 years, 
and since 2006 the tax system has included 
only 20 tax payments. This figure is by no 
means a reflection of the actual number of 
taxes paid by legal entities and individu-
als. Their number is significantly lower 
due to inclusion in this system of special 
tax regimes that replace the payment of 
some taxes, as well as certain taxes with 
taxable objects that are specific only for 
certain types of activities.
Compulsory social payments have un-
dergone drastic reform. The aggregate of 
these payments paid by employers from 
the wage fund to different addresses was 
replaced by a regressive unified social tax, 
the rate of which decreased from 35.6 % in 
1999 to 26 % in 2005. In addition to reduc-
ing the rate of a significant direct tax — 
UST, the rate has been reduced to 18 % 
since 2005 in the main indirect tax — VAT.
Another important area of improv-
ing the tax system, which directly affects 
not only the increase in tax revenues to 
the budget, but also the formation of a 
positive perception of this system by tax-
payers, has been a steady decline in the 
total number of tax benefits. This reduc-
tion was carried out, firstly, by eliminat-
ing ineffective benefits, often not reaching 
those intended for them, and secondly, by 
eliminating the benefits that distort the 
economic content of taxation, which are 
peculiar “loopholes” for minimizing tax 
obligations.
Virtually all taxes and fees were in-
ventoried to check the excessive number 
of benefits. For a number of taxes, such 
as for personal income tax and VAT, the 
number of indirect benefits was signifi-
cantly reduced. On other, for example, the 
profit tax of organizations, all direct ben-
efits were generally eliminated, including 
economically justified, and the most pop-
ular investment privilege. In addition, in 
the process of forming new chapters of the 
Tax Code, since 2002, lawmakers have al-
ready consciously sought to design taxes 
without the use of benefits. In some taxes, 
for example, in the tax on the extraction 
of minerals, they were able to fully imple-
ment it, in others, for example, in the state 
duty — no. Today, direct benefits as an 
element of taxation in the Tax Code have 
been left only in four taxes, but in camou-
flage form the benefits are still sufficiently 
present.
A significant success in improving the 
tax system was the implementation of a 
set of special tax regimes aimed at creating 
favorable tax conditions for certain cat-
egories of taxpayers. Favorable conditions 
here are determined by the possibility of 
reducing the tax burden, replacing of a 
number of taxes payment with a single tax 
payment, and, accordingly, a significant 
simplification of the tax administration 
procedure both at the level of the taxpayer 
and the tax authorities.
5. Tax burden and elections  
in Russian Federation
5.1. Tax burden and elections  
to the State Duma  
of the Russian Federation
In accordance with the proposed 
methodology for tax burden assessment, 
we should consider the relationship be-
tween its dynamics and elective periods 
(Figure 2).
The figure graphically shows the 
change in the tax burden in the election 
year. Each elective cycle is presented in 
the form of a line connecting points devi-
ating from the basic indicator. The basic 
indicator is taken in the year preceding 
the election.
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For example, in the first election cycle 
(elections to the State Duma in 1996), the 
nominal tax burden on the economy de-
creased by 0.2 to the previous year, and 
the real tax burden on the economy de-
creased by 1.5. The effective consumption 
tax rate (–3.4) fell most of all, and the effec-
tive rate of taxes on labor, on the contrary, 
increased by 0.4.
Comparing the indicators of the tax 
burden with the stages of the electoral 
cycle, we can note the following:
– the nominal tax burden on the econ-
omy, which characterizes the ratio of the 
amount of assessed mandatory payments 
to the value of the corresponding result of 
activity, always decreases during the pe-
riod of elections to the State Duma of the 
Russian Federation. This means that ap-
propriate changes are made in the legisla-
tion, allowing to reduce the accrued taxes 
or, more simply, laws are adopted in favor 
of voters or their individual groups;
– the actual tax burden characterizing 
the ratio of the amount of actually paid 
mandatory payments to the value of the 
corresponding result of the activity chang-
es not so uniquely and slightly increases 
during certain elective periods, which 
may indicate the activation of tax author-
ity activities and the improvement of tax 
collection in the relevant period;
– the effective rate of consumption 
taxes depends to the greatest extent on the 
electoral cycle. The effective rate of these 
taxes declined in five elective periods of six;
– with an increase in the tax burden, 
preference is given to taxes on labor, 
whose effective tax rate is more frequent 
than for other taxes growing in the elec-
tion year;
– the most ambiguous manner is dem-
onstrated by the most effective tax rate for 
the income tax, which fluctuations depend, 
inter alia, on the economic situation and do 
not lend themselves to instant regulation;
– “tax scissors” have a significant 
“opening angle” in earlier election peri-
ods. This indicates, first, the gradual im-
provement of tax discipline on account of 
increasing the effectiveness of tax admin-
istration, and secondly, that the tax burden 
becomes more acceptable to taxpayers.
– the first, second and fifth elective pe-
riods (1995, 1999 and 2011, respectively) 
are the most “unstable” periods from the 
point of view of chaotic changes in tax leg-
islation. In these periods there is a variety 
of changes in the tax sphere: an increase in 
the effective rate of labor taxes is accom-
panied by a decrease in the effective tax 
rate for consumption or vice versa;
– the third, fourth and sixth elective 
periods (2003, 2007 and 2016, respectively) 
were the most stable periods in terms of 
the changes that were implemented char-
acterized by a decrease or stabilization of 
all components of the tax burden.
"Tax scissors"
1995 –0,2 –1,5 –3,4 –2,2 0,4 1,3
1999 –3,2 0,3 –0,7 0,8 4,7 –3,5
2003 –2,2 –1,2 –2,2 –2,0 –2,0 –1,0
2007 –0,7 0,6 –0,4 0,7 0,6 –1,3
2011 –1,0 –0,4 0,5 –4,5 1,2 –0,6
2016 –1,0 –1,2 –0,1 0 –0,3 0,2
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Figure 2. Deviation of the tax burden during the elections to the State Duma  
(the percentage point to the previous year)
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5.2. The tax burden and the election  
of the President of the Russian Federation
As we said above, the transformation 
of the tax system belongs to the preroga-
tive of legislative power. However, the 
role of the President of the country in the 
decision-making system in all spheres of 
country’s life is very high. The Institute of 
the President in modern Russia is one of 
the key institutes in the system of public 
authorities. In recent years, the positions 
of the presidency institute in the system 
of public authorities have acquired quali-
tatively new features. In fact, the rela-
tions developing in the system of political 
power in Russia testify, first of all, to the 
strengthening of the influence of the Rus-
sian Federation President on all branches 
of power. In addition, the institution of the 
presidency has become the main, integrat-
ing and consolidating factor in the coun-
try. Taking into account the role occupied 
by this institution in the life of the country, 
it can be argued that the fate of the entire 
Russian state depends on its development.
Taking into account the aforesaid, we 
shall consider interrelation of indicators 
of tax burden with an electoral cycle on 
elections of the President. Data charac-
terizing tax changes in different elective 
periods are shown in Figure 3. We could 
not include in the analysis the election 
period of 2018 due to the lack of statisti-
cal data. Therefore, the analysis includes 
five elective periods: the first — 1996; 
the second — 2000; the third — 2004; the 
fourth — 2008; the fifth — 2012.
Comparing the indicators of the tax 
burden with the stages of the electoral 
cycle, we can note the following:
– the nominal tax burden on the econ-
omy, which characterizes the ratio of the 
amount of assessed mandatory payments 
to the value of the corresponding result 
of activity, significantly decreased only in 
the first election period (1996) generally 
characterized by contradictory changes in 
the taxation sphere.
– the real tax burden characterizing 
the ratio of the amount of actually paid 
mandatory payments to the value of the 
corresponding result of activity in all elec-
tive periods, except for the first one, tend-
ed to increase. Most likely, this is due to 
a certain increase in administrative pres-
sure on big business in order to improve 
the collection of taxes to finance costs in 
the relevant period;
– most often, during the presidential 
elections, the effective rate of taxes on 
gross profit decreased;
– the effective tax rate for taxes on 
labor, most often, increased, the same as 
during the election periods for elections to 
the State Duma of the Russian Federation;
– the most “unstable” periods from 
the point of view of chaotic changes in tax 
1996 –2,2 –4,5 8,0 –4,6 –0,5 2,3
2000 3,7 3,1 1,1 1,8 2,0 0,6
2004 1,9 0,9 –0,5 4,4 –1,1 1,9
2008 –0,4 0 0,2 –0,6 –4,1 –0,4
2012 0,1 0,1 0 –0,6 0,6 0,1
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Figure 3. Deviation of tax burden indicators in the year of the Elections  
of the RF President (percentage point to the previous year)
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legislation are the first and third elective 
periods (1996, 2004, respectively). In these 
periods there is a variety of changes in the 
tax sphere — an increase in the effective 
rate of taxes on labor or gross income is 
accompanied by a decrease in the effective 
tax rate for consumption or vice versa;
– the most stable periods in terms 
of the changes were the second and fifth 
elective periods (2000, 2012 respectively), 
the first of which was characterized by an 
increase in all components of the tax bur-
den, and the second period was accompa-
nied by virtually no changes in indicators.
5.3. Dynamics of tax burden  
and electoral cycle in Russia
Consider the effective rates for profit, 
labor and consumption in the dynamics 
(Figure 4).
The analysis of effective rates for la-
bor, profit and consumption in the context 
of electoral cycles shows their multidirec-
tional dynamics over the years of the cycle 
(Figure 4).
1. In the election year and next year of 
the electoral cycle, there is an increase in 
effective rates for profit, consumption and 
labor. This trend was especially noticeable 
in the first electoral cycles, when there was 
considerable competition in the presiden-
tial elections. So, consumption taxes in-
creased at the beginning of the second and 
third electoral cycles. For taxes on labor, 
this trend is even more pronounced. Taxes 
on labor increased at the beginning of the 
first, second, third and even at the begin-
ning of the sixth electoral cycle. On profit, 
the situation is somewhat different. There 
an upward trend is observed in the first, 
third and fourth electoral cycles.
2. In the final years of the electoral 
cycle, a decrease in effective rates for 
profit, consumption and labor is noted. 
Consumption taxes are reduced at the end 
of the first, second, third and fourth elec-
toral cycles. For taxes on profit, the burden 
decreases at the end of the first, third and 
fifth electoral cycles. For taxes on labor, 
this decrease is noticeable only at the end 
of the third and fourth cycles.
Thus, the influence of electoral cycles 
on Russia’s tax system is a cyclical in-
crease in the tax burden on the main ele-
ments of GDP in the first years of cycles 
and the lowering of the tax burden in the 
final years of electoral cycles. At the same 
time, it can be noted that the volatility of 
the tax burden indicators decreases in the 
last two electoral cycles, when the presi-
dential elections in Russia no longer had a 
significant political intrigue. Accordingly, 
it may be reasonable to conclude that the 
volatility of the tax burden indicators for 
the main elements of GDP increases when 
the variability of electoral choice and the 
competitiveness of President’s elections 
increase. However, the volatility of tax 
burden indicators on the main elements 
of GDP decreases when the variability of 
electoral choice and the competitiveness 
of the head of state elections are reduced.
We shall verify this conclusion by 
analyzing the tax burden indicators on the 
Russian economy as a whole (Figure 5).
In the first four electoral cycles, there 
is a clear trend of increasing the tax bur-
den on the country’s economy in the first 
years of cycles and reducing these indica-
tors in the final years of the cycles. At the 
beginning of the fifth cycle, the decrease in 
the tax burden on the country’s economy 
is due not to the influence of the electoral 
cycle, but to the impact of the global eco-
nomic crisis and a marked decrease in 
the profitability of companies and, cor-
respondingly, to a decrease in the deduc-
tions from profits in favor of the state.
Moreover, the real and nominal tax 
burden indicators change during the elec-
toral cycle almost synchronously, repeat-
ing the trends of the initial increase and 
the final decrease during each cycle. In the 
fifth and sixth cycles, the upward trend in 
the indicators is not observed, but only the 
decreasing dynamics is noted. This reac-
tion of the tax load on the economy dur-
ing the first four cycles and the absence of 
such volatility in the last cycles confirms 
the earlier conclusion about the impact of 
competitive electoral cycles on the coun-
try’s tax system. Moreover, the higher the 
variability of electoral choice and the com-
petitiveness of the elections themselves, 
the more noticeable are the quantitative 
changes in taxation.
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As for qualitative changes in tax ad-
ministration, we suggest using the indi-
cator of “tax scissors” as the difference 
between the calculated and collected 
taxes (Figure 5) as an integral measure 
of such changes. It can be seen that the 
index of “tax scissors” reaches a maxi-
mum in the second and third electoral cy-
cles, and since the fourth cycle has been 
steadily declining. This positive change 
indicates a steady increase in the collec-
tion of taxes. There is no stable connec-
tion with electoral cycles.
6. Tax legislation, amnesty  
and elections
6.1. The number of changes  
introduced into the tax legislation  
and elections
Let us also consider the question of 
whether there is a correlation between 
the stages of the electoral cycle and the 
number of changes introduced into the 
tax legislation. Under the tax legislation, 
as part of the study, we will understand 
the special tax legislation (tax and levy 
legislation) that is, laws that regulate 
only the sphere of tax relations. Of the 
four levels of the system of legislation 
on taxes and fees that regulate tax re-
lations3, we will only consider the Tax 
Code of the Russian Federation (RF Tax 
Code). The Tax Code fixes the most im-
portant provisions on tax relations and it 
is the main law in the tax law.
We can reliably determine the number 
of changes introduced into the tax legisla-
tion only after the introduction of the tax 
code of the Russian Federation. The first 
part of the code was introduced in 1999 
and from that moment on it has been con-
stantly amended. The number of changes 
was calculated using the Consultant Plus 
system. The number of changes in parts 
one and two of the Tax Code of the Rus-
sian Federation was counted under the 
text of each law introducing amendments 
and additions to the Tax Code, the num-
ber of changes was summarized by years. 
The results are imposed only on the elec-
toral cycle for elections to the State Duma 
of the Russian Federation. The results are 
graphically shown in Figure 6.
3 Four levels of tax legislation are: The Tax 
Code of the Russian Federation (RF Tax Code) is 
a codified act of higher legal force; federal laws 
on taxes and fees, adopted in accordance with 
the Tax Code of the Russian Federation; laws and 
other normative acts of legislative (representa-
tive) bodies of the subjects of the Russian Federa-
tion; normative acts of representative bodies of 
local self-government.
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The figure clearly shows a decrease 
in legislative activity in relation to the 
number of changes in the electoral period. 
An analysis of these changes shows that 
in the first years of cycles the number of 
changes is less compared to the following 
years. The greatest number of changes is 
taken in the third year of the cycle. This 
dependence is manifested in the period of 
all analyzed cycles. Thus, the number of 
changes introduced was sharply reduced 
in 2003, 2007. A slight decrease can be not-
ed in 2011. As for the last election period, 
the trend is not traced here. Supposing the 
elections did not move forward for a year 
and were held in 2015, then we would see 
a decrease in legislative activity again.
The figure clearly shows a decrease 
in legislative activity in relation to the 
number of changes in the electoral period. 
An analysis of these changes shows that 
in the first years of cycles the number of 
changes is less compared to the following 
years. The greatest number of changes is 
taken in the third year of the cycle. This 
dependence is manifested in the period of 
all analyzed cycles. Thus, the number of 
changes introduced was sharply reduced 
in 2003, 2007. A slight decrease can be not-
ed in 2011. As for the last election period, 
the trend is not traced here. Supposing the 
elections did not move forward for a year 
and were held in 2015, then we would see 
a decrease in legislative activity again.
6.2. Tax amnesty and elections
We are not going to consider the results 
and effectiveness of tax amnesties conduct-
ed. We proceed from the assumption that a 
tax amnesty may simply be a signal to the 
society or its individual groups and won’t 
have a direct budgetary effect.
In the recent history of the Russian 
Federation, three announced tax amnes-
ties have been carried out.
The first tax amnesty in 1993 was 
brought into compliance with the Presi-
dential Decree No. 1773 “On the Tax 
Amnesty in 1993”. According to the De-
cree, legal entities and individuals who 
declared before November 30, 1993 the 
amounts of previously unpaid taxes and 
transferred them to the budget, were 
exempt from tax sanctions. In case of 
revealing companies’ hidden income af-
ter this date, the bodies of the State Tax 
Service were obliged to collect fines from 
them in triplicate. During the period of 
the amnesty, about 2,000 individuals ap-
plied to the tax authorities.
The international experts B. Torgler 
and C. Schaltegger distinguish as a tax 
amnesty the exemption of certain orga-
nizations from tax debts [20]. From this 
point of view, the restructuring of arrears 
in taxes and fees, announced at the end 
of 1999 and conducted in 2000–2001 can 
also be attributed to a tax amnesty4. The 
amnesty was not of a total character. De-
cisions on the restructuring were made 
by the RF Ministry of Taxes and Tax Col-
lection in the presence of an opinion on 
the solvency of economic entities of the 
Federal Service of Russia for financial re-
covery and bankruptcy, or by a territorial 
tax authority if the amount of the debt 
did not exceed 20 million rubles. The de-
cision to restructure debts of organiza-
tions that are of strategic importance for 
the national security or of socio-economic 
importance was taken by the Govern-
ment of the Russian Federation.
The next announced tax amnesty was 
held from March 1 to December 31, 20075. 
In accordance with the law, individuals 
were asked to individually calculate the 
tax debt, based on the rate of 13 % of all 
income received before January 1, 2006. 
Curious can be called some results. The 
total income from payment of declarative 
payment amounted to 3, 6 billion rubles 
(considering the tax rate, the total amount 
of declared income was about 28 billion 
rubles). The income of declarative pay-
ment was formed mainly at the expense 
of two constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation: Moscow and the Chukotka 
Autonomous District, which provided 
74 % of the total receipts of declarative 
4 The procedure for restructuring the ac-
counts payable of legal entities for taxes and dues, 
as well as arrears of accrued interest and penalties 
to the federal budget was approved by Resolu-
tion of the Government of the Russian Federation 
No. 1002 of September 3, 1999.
5 The federal law “On the simplified proce-
dure for declaring income by individuals”.
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payments (58 and 16 % respectively). It 
can be said that this amnesty also was not 
total and was used by certain individuals.
The third official tax amnesty was 
announced in 20176. The amnesty should 
concern a large number of individuals for 
whom it is envisaged to write off tax debts 
formed on January 1, 2015 for property 
taxes (which include the transport tax, 
property tax of individuals and land tax). 
For individual entrepreneurs and individ-
uals who were previously engaged in en-
trepreneurial activities, it is envisaged to 
write off tax debts and part of the arrears 
of insurance premiums.
So we can conclude that carrying out 
tax amnesties is unambiguously linked 
with the electoral process, and the mo-
ment of their implementation is confined 
to the elective period (see Figure 7).
7. Conclusions 
As a result of the study of the relation-
ship between tax reforms in Russia and 
electoral cycles, we consider the following 
points reasoned.
1. The relationship between tax re-
forms and electoral cycles in Russia is un-
ambiguously present. The first two stages 
of tax reforms directly coincided with the 
electoral cycles. The third modern stage of 
tax reforms is implemented during sev-
eral electoral cycles.
2. The intensity of the interrelationship 
between tax reforms and electoral cycles in 
6 In accordance with the Order of the Presi-
dent of the Russian Federation, as well as Fede-
ral Law No. 436-FZ of December 28, 2017 “On 
Amending Part One and Two of the Tax Code of 
the Russian Federation and Certain Legislative 
Acts of the Russian Federation”.
Russia depends on the nature of the elec-
tion: interconnections are strengthened 
in the conduct of competitive elections 
and these relationships are weakened in 
the absence of significant competition in 
the elections. Accordingly, the higher the 
variability of electoral choice and the com-
petitiveness of presidential elections, the 
more noticeable are quantitative changes 
in the sphere of taxation.
3. The electoral cycles for the elections 
to the State Duma of the Russian Federa-
tion have a stronger impact on tax reforms 
in Russia. The nominal tax burden on the 
economy is always reduced during the 
election period for elections to the State 
Duma of the Russian Federation. This 
means that the relevant changes in the 
legislation allow reducing the amount 
of taxes or, more simply, the State Duma 
passes laws in favor of taxpayers or their 
individual groups.
4. Electoral cycles for the election of the 
President of the Russian Federation have a 
less noticeable effect on tax reforms. Dur-
ing the presidential election, the effective 
rate of taxes on gross profit, as a rule, de-
creases. The effective tax rate for taxes on 
labor, most often, increased, as during the 
election periods for elections to the State 
Duma of the Russian Federation.
5. There is an increase in effective rates 
for profit, consumption and labor in the 
election year and next year of the electoral 
cycle. In the final years of the electoral cy-
cle, there is a decrease in effective rates for 
profit, consumption and labor. Thus, the 
influence of electoral cycles on Russia’s 
tax system is a cyclical increase in the tax 
burden on the main elements of GDP in 
the first years of cycles and the lowering 
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of the tax burden in the final years of elec-
toral cycles.
6. The analysis of changes in tax legis-
lation during the electoral cycles showed 
that legislative activity to reform the Rus-
sian tax system is not uniform throughout 
each cycle. In the first years of the cycle, 
the number of changes is less than in the 
subsequent years of this cycle. The greatest 
number of changes in the tax legislation is 
adopted in the third year of the cycle.
7. The analysis of the tax amnesties 
conducted in Russia has shown that am-
nesties are unambiguously linked to the 
electoral process and their conduct is con-
fined to the elective period.
8. The analysis of the effective rates 
for labor, consumption and profit in the 
connection with electoral cycles allows to 
assume that after the presidential election 
in 2018 we should expect an increase in 
the tax burden on labor.
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